



A mosque in Hotan, an oasis city in Xinjiang.
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Khotan-mezquita-d04.jpg>

CHINA'S RELIGIOUS POLICY IN XINJIANG: FUELING VIOLENCE?

RESURGENCE of RUSSIA & CHINA PROGRAMME

ABSTRACT

Even though the China's government has clearly stated its respect and protection toward religious freedom, there is still a lot of criticism against it. The reasons are some controversial policies legalized and implemented that are highly contested on the basis of universal understanding about the religious freedom rights. The latest one is the issue of the ban of Ramadan ritual of fasting for Muslims in Xinjiang, which has been spread widely and blown out rapidly through media. However, there is a denial against its accuracy from some officials and an additional note on state interest and common good. An investigation to some original sources shows, in facts, that there is fasting restriction on several institutions in Xinjiang. This restriction surely cannot be separated from the macro policy on religious rights and the terrorism crackdown in China. Such a restriction is also not much beneficial to the fight against terrorism, separatism and religious fundamentalism due to lack of proof of its effectiveness and stirring stronger a religious sentiment. Instead, the policy will create a backlash that endanger China's interest on Islamic world and. Then, the worst, it will perpetuate and escalate violence.

Dani

jayamulyanto@gmail.com

China's Current Religious Policy in Xinjiang: Ramadan Fasting Restriction

One of the hottest issues about China policies in Xinjiang, is the ban for Muslim Xinjiang from observing the Ramadan holy month. It includes the prohibition of fasting which is one of the most fundamental rituals done by Muslim during Ramadan.

The story, which went viral rapidly and widely, can be traced back from one of the most cited source, Associated Press (AP) news article, dated 3 July 2014.¹ Being titled as, “China Bans Ramadan Fast in Muslim Northwest,” the article becomes a primary source for many global media, such as Aljazeera,² Huffington Post³ and Washington Post⁴. Another source is Agence France-Presse (AFP),⁵ which is also referred quite broadly, for example by BBC⁶, Channel News Asia⁷ and Strait Times⁸.

The AP mentioned that “students” and “civil servants” “have

been ordered to avoid taking part in traditional fasting,” and some “schools, government agencies and local party organizations in the Xinjiang region” had posted an announcement on their website. The reason given by the authorities is “protecting students’ wellbeing and preventing use of schools and government offices to promote religion.” The AP cited the internet source of the government of Yili, the Bole municipal party committee, the Bozhou University of Radio and

The AP mentioned that “students” and “civil servants” “have been ordered to avoid taking part in traditional fasting”

Television, the Zhaosu county local party committee, the Moyu Weather Bureau Hotan and the Commercial Bureau in Turban, which have related content.

Another source, the AFP which was quoted by the Channel News Asia mentioned the website of a weather bureau in Qaraqash County, giving similar call, “all current and retired staff not to fast during Ramadan.” BBC, through its own reporters, claimed to have directly interacted with three Muslim students in Xinjiang about being “made to eat” otherwise there was the risk of being punished.

On the other hand, some officials of China have expressed the fallacy on that news. Bernama,⁹ the national news agency of Malaysia, which was quoted by, inter alia, Channel News Asia,¹⁰ Strait Times¹¹ and the Malaysian Insider,¹² confirmed this rejection. It said that after participating in the Corporate Malaysia Roundtable organised by the Asian Strategy & Leadership Institute in Kuala Lumpur, the China Ambassador to Malaysia, Dr. Huang Huikuang clarified the untrue characteristic of the information and questioned the foreign media which reported the ban. A Pakistan-based media, the Nation also reported that a spokesman of the Chinese Embassy which was possibly in Islamabad office rejected totally the report about the ban.¹³ However, the article also quoted his additional comment saying, “School children are the future of the country, and they are in their critical phase of life in terms of physical growth and knowledge acquisition. Considering the juveniles’ healthy growth, we believe that they should not take part in

“Considering the juveniles’ healthy growth, we believe that they should not take part in Ramadan fasting. The same also goes with public servants who are special groups serving the society.”

Ramadan fasting. The same also goes with public servants who are special groups serving the society.” In fact, this Chinese Embassy spokesman’s comment, reveals a loophole and a clue on this controversy. The comment confirms that the restriction against fasting or at least the push not to fast for children and public servants are likely to be true.

Also, a report from Quartz which inserted a link of the original source,

brings another interesting hint.¹⁴ The Tarim River Basin Management Bureau Xinjiang website published a piece of news¹⁵ about the members of Communist Party in a village celebrating the Party Day, July 1st. Quartz report mentioned people “eating during the daylight.”¹⁶

Then, the New York Times published another bite of proof with a link to the original source.¹⁷ A Chinese medicine hospital in Yining, Xinjiang, asked “the minority ethnic groups to sign

a responsibility letter of not fasting in order not to influence normal work and life,” as shown in the Weibo account of Health Department of Yining.¹⁸


A local Chinese internet media, Guanchazhe, even wrote a more vivid report.¹⁹ It confirms AP report about fasting restriction for the party cadres and civil servants, issued by the Commerce Bureau in Turpan. It added the similar ban issued by the Transportation Bureau in Yilizhou. Furthermore, I successfully verify the AP’s quotation “the No. 3 Grade School in Ruoqiang County in Xinjiang,” despite of no existence of direct link on the article. It is a piece of news article published on the No. 3 Elementary School - Ruoqiang County Xinjiang website with its titled “Launching Publication Educational Activity about the Fasting Prohibition of Teachers and Students.”²⁰

Even though amidst the rapidly flowing and unclear news article on Ramadan fasting ban in Xinjiang in the internet and the denial from Chinese officials, the direct and inside news sources above, have been able to confirm the truth of the issue. However,

there is a nuance to be paid attention to, particularly concerning the accurate details on the degree of violation against religious freedom rights.

Between the Macro Policy on Religious Rights and Anti-terrorism Crackdown

The Ramadan fast restriction in Xinjiang recently cannot be viewed separately from two important aspects. First, the macro religious policy is formulated and implemented in throughout China. Second, the specific circumstances are owned by Xinjiang region, which is particularly connected to the terrorism act, occurred in increasingly intensity since a few years back.



Demography of religions in China: Islam (green) which is mostly concentrated in the Northwest part, including Xinjiang province. Others are Han traditional beliefs such as Confucianism and Taoism (red), Buddhism (yellow), non-Han traditional faiths (purple) and Mongolian shamanism (light green). http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Demography_of_religions_in_China.png

The highest legal framework, the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has stated clearly the religious freedom right in the article 36. "No State organ, public organization or individual may force citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion."²¹

Article 34 also provides a clear basis of the right to vote and stand for election regardless religious belief. Despite of those ideal statements, there is a quite controversial sentence, since there is very large room for defining the word,

"normal." "The State protects **normal** religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State."²² Yang (2013) explained that the interpretation is left to the related authorities, thus loose interpretation is possible to issue severe regulations enforced by the local "militant atheist" cadres.²³ Another important regulation, the Regulation of

Religious Affairs (2005)²⁴, despite of more freedom offered, it still has many weaknesses, such as the authority control by registration requirements for religious organisations, monitoring, and ongoing discrimination to some believers (Carlson, cited in Yang, 2013). Xiong (2013) described that the "normal"

"The State protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State."

definition lies on the article 12 of the Regulation, which is basically an adherence to the authority control.²⁵ The Law of Education, in addition, requires the separation between religion and education.

Under such laws, the government only authorises five religions through five authorised bodies: the Buddhist Association of China, the Chinese Taoist Association, the Islamic Association of China, the Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement, and the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association. As a result, there is no legal and formal relationship with Vatican; there are emerging underground churches and various other denominations that have

negative outlook toward the authorities; and there is the ban and persecution against Falungong which is labeled as an “evil cult.”

The position of Tibetan Buddhism and Islam in Xinjiang is also more difficult. Although the Law of Regional National Autonomy supports the freedom of religion of ethnic groups, yet they are “subject to qualifications against harm to social order, personal health, and state education.”²⁶ It is a clear proof how the authorities have certain top priorities over the religious freedom rights.

Moreover, both Tibetan Buddhist and Uyghur Muslim are often linked to separatism effort, which provokes further fear and repressive act by the authorities (Wellens, cited in Yang, 2013).²⁷ This ignites further violent acts from the separatist groups, which are generally labeled as the acts of terrorism. Whereas this phenomenon of the devil circle is not newly found, violence has been intensified in terms of both quantity and quality, since a few years ago, especially related to Xinjiang region. A

violent riot in 2009 which left around two hundred died, stabbing in March 2013 in Kunming railway station, a vehicle crash in October 2013 in Tiananmen Square and a bomb explosion in Urumqi in April 2014 are only some to mention. In May 2014, Washington Post wrote about the “getting worse” situation, while

It is a clear proof how the authorities have certain top priorities over the religious freedom rights.

suggesting “militant Islam” as one of four main reasons.²⁸ On the other side, China authorities are also in a very serious enterprise

to fight against terrorism in its own soil. In June 2014, China’s National Anti-terrorism Leading Group, which was established in 2013, “launched a year-long campaign against terrorist attacks and violence across China,” state-backed-up media, China daily said.²⁹ It also stated that the main bodies of the group are Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Armed Police Force, and People Liberation Army General Staff, demonstrating the inclination to a more security and military approach. In fact, Beijing still fundamentally uses the concept of “three evils” which consists

of terrorism, separatism and religious fundamentalism.³⁰

Based on this explanation above, the fasting restriction policy against Muslim Xinjiang is not unpredictable.

Inspired by the idea of Marxism, the socialist state of China does not prioritise much the issue of protection toward religious freedom as the international norms define. Despite of the intention to respect the freedom to belief, the “loopholes” are intentionally left on the Constitution that create further ambiguity on other regulations and much more on the implementation. Moreover, combining with the fight against separatism and terrorism, the ban is received its strong internal justification. Yet, the greater question is whether the ban will be really effective in the war against the three evils as expected.

Detonating or Defusing the Bomb of Terrorism?

Based on its perceived values of the Chinese socialism³¹ and emphasis on stability and security, China authorities

may argue that the ban will contribute positively in a fight against terrorism, separatism and religious fundamentalism. However there are important points that they should consider:

Yet, the greater question is whether the ban will be really effective in the war against the three evils as expected.

1. There is no strong evidence that religious limitation policy is effective against terrorism.

While fast restriction during Ramadan has been implemented for several years, there is no proof whether violence has been significantly decreased. This year since Ramadan, violence has been continuing and quite intensified. Reuter reported almost 100 killed just a few days before and after Ramadan ended, following 37 civilians and 59 “terrorists” murdered.³² Jume Tahir, the imam of Id Kah mosque, who had been always on the side of the government, was assassinated on July 30.³³ Six Han farmers were stabbed to death on July 7, and following that, one Uyghur was shot down.³⁴ In spite of the doubt of direct causal relationship to the ongoing violence, the fasting ban in Ramadan definitely does not offer

positive contribution to decreasing violence effort.

Despite admitting that “coercive measures are not likely to change the perceived legitimacy of the government” and possibly “reduce the duration of terrorist campaigns,” Daxecker and Hess (2013) still argued that this will not be beneficial for the long term goal.³⁵ Also, Perkoski (2010), while researching the effectiveness of counterterrorism in Spain, did not refer to religious restriction policy as a useful tactic to be implemented.³⁶ Based on the research of Miller (2007), he emphasised better understanding the groups’ motivation as the key of an effective policy to counter religious-coloured terrorism.

2. The religious sentiment will be stirred more strongly, and thus will be a productive “weapon” for building wider support and legitimacy.

The stronger and wider religious sentiment stirred by the restriction can be observed from several religion-based media or the responses from Muslim world. Some of them, for example, are Saudi Arabia-based Arab News³⁷, India-based Muslim Mirror³⁸ and Indonesia-

based Republika³⁹. The Arab News also reported that Mohammed Badahdah, assistant secretary-general of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, protesting againsts the Chinese government’s “anti-Islam policies for the past several years.”⁴⁰ The same media also said the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is contacting the China authority for having a dialogue about the issue. The protest from wide public can also be read in the comment part of the articles above and social media.⁴¹



Several days before the September 2009 unrest, armed police soldiers and armored vehicles in the street of Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang region.

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Armed_Police_armored_vehicles

Ma and Chang (2014) argue that there is “an unintended consequence of the Ramadan fasting ban,” which is “the further alienation of some Uyghurs who have worked for the government and have already have been integrated into

Chinese officialdom and Chinese elite culture.”⁴² This alienation certainly brings social disharmony that may perpetuates and even intensifies into the cycle of violence as being happened. Tom Malinowski, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, on the launching of the US State Department annual report on religious freedom, stated that religious repression in Xinjiang “increases the potential of violent extremism.”⁴³ The Diplomat also criticised that “Beijing’s tight restrictions...are troubling,” which may ignite further horizontal violent conflict like what happened during the Cultural Revolution.⁴⁴ Edward Schwarck, an Asia expert at the UK-based Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, stated, “There is clearly a causal link between hard-line law enforcement and Uighur violence,” and various bans of local expressions are “deeply provocative and frequently spark violent reactions.”⁴⁵

The repressive regulation on religious affairs, such as the restriction on fasting during Ramadan for Uyghur Muslim, is not an appropriate and well-

thought decision. Even though Powers (2014) argued that the religious curb has been done since a few years ago, and does not necessarily incite “violent opposition,”⁴⁶ it still will bring more negative impacts, rather than the positive ones as expected. Apprehension and imbalance will be gradually accumulated. Thus, violence will be likely to be perpetuated, and escalated. Ma Haiyun, who was a former task force leader on minority welfare in China and currently a lecturer at Frostburg State University, “argues that the only way to prevent more violence is to revise the current repressive policies on the Uyghur minority.”⁴⁷ Eşref Yalınkılıçlı, a Eurasia Analyst, suggests that one of the solutions for Xinjiang is putting more respect on the human rights.⁴⁸ Mubashar Hasan, Griffith University, stated that “a more nuanced, diplomatic and inclusive approach to integrate Uyghurs” is the answer to the violent conflict.⁴⁹ It is not strange then, Johan Galtung (2005), the father of peace studies, recommended that China should look back its traditional wisdom of Tao, “in strength weakness, in weakness strength” in which “(r)epression shows the weakness of China; gentler constructions may look

weaker but are strong enough to do without.”⁵⁰ I conclude that it is the time now for China to rethink deeper and more holistically their religious policy in Xinjiang, which is hopefully more coherent with the paradigm of “a harmonious society” and “peace” they are promoting.⁵¹ China authorities have, at least one year, to formulate a better policy, before the next Ramadan coming. Otherwise, China’s global ambitions in the Islamic world may be threatened and the trade and investments will be damaged. Furthermore, the most catastrophic one is that another time-bomb of terrorism will be possibly detonated to explode in the near future.

About 'Resurgence of Russia and China programme:

As the US starts to scale down its 'heavy footprint' from the Islamic-world; the resurgence of new powers becomes crucial to evaluate. The rise of today's regional and tomorrow's global power and their internal and external policies will determine future discourses. Among the rising economies and military powers; Russia and China stand out the most.

Russia has become a key global actor in the aftermath of Syrian revolution. It is the first time since the end of the cold war that Russia is not only directly involved in managing global affairs but has even managed to dictate them in Syria as well as in Georgia Taking further advantage from its new role of an emerging global power; Russia is now seeking new relations in different regions of the Islamic-world i.e. Middle East (Egypt, Syria), Central and South Asia etc.

Chinese foreign policy in the different regions of the Islamic-world can be seen a combination of foreign policy approaches. The over-riding themes of Chinese foreign policy however remains limited to the projection of 'soft power' mixed with economic interaction and developmental strategies. This paradigm may not be sustainable in the near-future as the global system seems to shift towards multi-polarity. Chinese inter-relations with the US hard power and their economic interdependency may empower its soft foreign policy approaches. If however, these trends continue to change as the current geo-strategic trends demonstrate, Chinese foreign policy may have to radically change in terms of projecting its economic and military power in order to cater for its huge energy demands, resources and raw material etc.

Furthermore; although China and Russia may have different geopolitical interests; they have also found common grounds and convergences of interests on different global issues. As the US tries to 'rebalance' Asia Pacific and Eastern Europe: the convergences of interests are likely to steadily grow in the near to mid-term future.

Finally; as the internal unrest grows in many parts of the Islamic-world; the role of emerging power such as China and Russia will be hugely important to monitor.

Key Feature of the programme:

- Analysis of China and Russia's historic development in the last few decades
- Analysis of contemporary socio-political trends within China and Russia
- Analysis and evaluation of current Chinese and Russian foreign policy models and paradigms, particularly in the regions of the Islamic-world
- Exploration and evaluation of China and Russia's military and defence strategies
- Exploration and evaluation of Chinese cyber-warfare capabilities
- Analysis of fragility or sustainability of western power and Pax-Americana
- Analysis of the inter-relation of the emerging powers i.e. India, Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar etc. with China and Russia
- Analysis of new blocs particularly Shanghai cooperation organisation (SCO) or ASEAN and Chinese
- influence and Russian led 'custom' and 'trade' Unions
- Establishment and anticipation of different Chinese and Russian foreign policy models, using 'futurology' studies and by the above mentioned analyses of current and emerging trends etc.

About Us

IISA is a think-tank and an intellectual forum for addressing the current and future dynamics of the Islamic-world and its interaction with Western civilisation. Based in London, IISA will create trans-Islamic and global reach. IISA seeks to establish a platform where Islamic-world's dynamics, trends, issue, problems or crises are analysed within the Islamic-world and by working on local models and realities and not against any external standards or perceptions. We will be one of the leading think-tank on the Islamic-world and its role in the contemporary global system. In a short span of time we have attracted great academic support and a reputation for both open and track-II dialogues. IISA is the only think tank initiative that goes beyond national and regional inclinations and addresses strategic and socio-political issues/crises of the Islamic-world in its totality. For more

information i.e. our mission statement, current programmes and our academic and regional expertise please visit the following links:

- **Website:** www.iisa.org.uk
- **Blog:** <http://iisablog.org/>
- **Twitter:** https://twitter.com/IISA_org
- **Facebook:** <https://www.facebook.com/pages/IISA-Institute-of-Islamic-Strategic-Socio-Political-Affairs/118608928247992?ref=hl>

References:

- ¹ <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/china-bans-ramadan-fast-muslim-northwest>.
- ² <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2014/07/china-bans-ramadan-fasting-muslim-province-20147371648541558.html>.
- ³ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/02/china-bans-ramadan_n_5551063.html.
- ⁴ <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/2/china-bans-ramadan-fasting-muslim-northwest/>.
- ⁵ Unfortunately I cannot find the original article page on the AFP website, neither in English nor French.
- ⁶ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-28123267>.
- ⁷ <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/china-restricts-ramadan/1229848.html>.
- ⁸ <http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/east-asia/story/china-restricts-ramadan-fasting-xinjiang-20140702>.
- ⁹ I did not retrieve the original source from Bernama <http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v7/bu/newsmarkets.php?id=1051292>, which requires a payment of subscription.
- ¹⁰ <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/china-ambassador-denies/1235020.html>.
- ¹¹ <http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/china-envoy-denies-xinjiang-muslims-banned-fasting-report-20140704>.
- ¹² <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/china-envoy-denies-xinjiang-muslims-banned-from-fasting-bernama>.
- ¹³ <http://www.nation.com.pk/national/09-Jul-2014/chinese-embassy-denies-reports-about-restricting-fasting-in-xinjiang>.
- ¹⁴ <http://qz.com/229329/beijing-has-banned-ramadan-for-many-muslims-in-xinjiang/#/h/82561,1,82565,1/>.
- ¹⁵ http://www.tahe.gov.cn/e/action/ShowInfo.php?classid=70&id=19170&_ga=1.179158754.737353116.1406546634.
- ¹⁶ The Quartz later translation is not fully appropriate, “shows they are people who admire science and want to improve society.” It is better to be interpreted as, “performing guidance to people to support toward scientific civilization, a responsibility to pursue the society advancement.” A more complete original paragraph is “会议结束后，工作组为参会人员准备了晚餐，与他们欢聚一堂，共庆即将到来的“七一”建党节，并向他们送上工作组的问候和祝福。虽恰逢穆斯林群众的斋月，但阿其克村参会党员和村干部用实际行动表明了态度、表明了观点，带头不封斋，展现了共产党员的先进性，履行了引导群众崇尚科学文明、追求社会进步的职责。”
- ¹⁷ http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/xinjiang-hospital-asks-staff-not-to-fast-during-ramadan/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%22RI%3A10%22%2C%22RI%3A17%22&r=1&_ga=1.251918031.737353116.1406546634.
- ¹⁸ The original text is “6月3日上午，中医院党支部书记张燧光组织医院少数民族职工召开了关于维护民族团结的会议。斋月即将开始，为了不影响正常工作和生活与少数民族职工签订不封斋责任书。” <http://weibo.com/3976148864/B7q5a2Ep9?mod=weibotime&type=comment>.
- ¹⁹ http://www.guancha.cn/politics/2014_07_03_243479.shtml. Guanchazhe is a media run by Chunqiu Zonghe Research Institution and Shanghai Guanchazhe Information Technology Company Ltd.
- ²⁰ The translation of text approximately is: “Firstly, to teachers and parents who come to the meeting, the Secretary (of the Party) has explained in detail about the related State policies and regulations, and announced strongly: teachers must not to participate in any religious activities, must not promote religious teachings to students, must not lead and threaten students to join religious activities; students must not go to religious schools nor reciting class to learn the holy text, not fasting, not wearing religious symbols, parents and others must not enforce students to adhere religions and to participate any religious activities.” <http://wazx.loulan.gov.cn/xiaoyuanxinwen/2014-06-30/43553.html>.
- ²¹ http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62714.htm.
- ²² Another intriguing clause on the Constitution is, “Religious bodies and religious affairs are **not subject to any foreign domination.**”
- ²³ Yang, Fenggang. 2013. A Research Agenda on Religious Freedom in China. The Review of Faith & International Affairs. II(2).
- ²⁴ <http://baike.baidu.com/view/961577.htm?fr=aladdin>.
- ²⁵ Xiong, Ping. 2013. Freedom of Religion in China Under the Current Legal Framework and Foreign Religious Bodies. Brigham Young University Law Review. Issue 3.
- ²⁶ Article 11, <http://baike.baidu.com/view/27861.htm>.
- ²⁷ Also, compare to Muslim Hui, <http://time.com/3099950/china-muslim-hui-xinjiang-uyghur-islam/>.

-
- ²⁸ The others are ethnic politics, (government's) repression, and marginalization, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/05/22/why-chinas-terrorism-problem-is-getting-worse/>.
- ²⁹ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014crackdownterrorists/2014-06/06/content_17569212.htm. See also a more complete coverage on "China Fights Terrorism and Violent Attacks" at China Daily <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014crackdownterrorists/>.
- ³⁰ See also: Holdstock, Nick. 2014. Islam and Instability in China's Xinjiang. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
- ³¹ Chinese (style) socialism – 中国社会主义, refers to the principles that root from, inter alia, the thought Marx, Lenin, Mao and were influenced by the contemporary leaders of China, such as Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.
- ³² <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/03/us-china-attacks-xinjiang-idUSKBN0G301H20140803>.
- ³³ <http://english.cntv.cn/2014/08/01/VIDE1406897759467141.shtml>.
- ³⁴ <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/stabbing-07142014010546.html>.
- ³⁵ Daxecker, U.E. & Hess, M.L. 2013. Repression Hurts? Coercive Counterterrorism Strategies and the Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. *British Journal of Political Science*. 43(3).
- ³⁶ Perkoski, E.J. 2010. Rethinking Repression: Exploring the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism in Spain. A thesis for Wesleyan University.
- ³⁷ <http://www.arabnews.com/news/595501>.
- ³⁸ <http://muslimmirror.com/eng/muslims-protest-chinas-ramadan-ban/>.
- ³⁹ There are several articles on this issue, including the denial from Ambassador Huang. The search of the articles with keywords "ban," "fast," and "China" can be seen here. <http://www.republika.co.id/search/larang%20puasa%20Cina>.
- ⁴⁰ <http://www.arabnews.com/news/596911>.
- ⁴¹ Also, see the online petition is proposed by a Malaysian using three languages, <https://www.change.org/petitions/his-excellency-president-xi-jinping-lift-the-ramadhan-fasting-ban-in-xinjiang-and-respect-religious-freedom-in-the-whole-of-china>.
- ⁴² Haiyun, Ma & Chang, IJ. 2014. "China to Uyghurs: Eat, Don't Fast for Ramadan." <http://islamiccommentary.org/2014/07/china-to-uyghurs-eat-dont-fast-for-ramadan/>
- ⁴³ <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/campaign-07282014190503.html>.
- ⁴⁴ <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/chinas-peoples-war-against-terrorism/>.
- ⁴⁵ <http://www.dw.de/xinjiang-restrictions-on-religion-may-lead-to-uyghur-radicalization/a-17841070>.
- ⁴⁶ I would argue that religious oppression is one of the expressions of what Power called "Beijing's colonial(ism)." See <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/empire-and-the-rising-violence-in-xinjiang/>.
- ⁴⁷ <http://www.themarknews.com/2014/07/17/the-fallout-of-chinas-uyghur-policy/#content>.
- ⁴⁸ <http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/07/19/uyghurs-predicament-between-sinification-and-chinese-securitization-in-xinjiang>.
- ⁴⁹ <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/07/19/an-immovable-object-and-an-unstoppable-force-the-uyghurs-and-beijing/>.
- ⁵⁰ Galtung, Johan. 2005. *Pax Pacifica: Terrorism, the Pacific Hemisphere, Globalisation and Peace Studies*. Pluto Press & Paradigm Publishers.
- ⁵¹ The idea of 和 (he), which means peace or harmony has been promoted intensely since several years ago. For example, for domestic policy it is "harmonious society" - 和谐社会. For foreign policy, it is "peaceful rise" - 和平崛起.